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Abstract – A bi-level modelling approach is proposed to represent the interaction between 
the vehicle loading practices of road freight transport carriers, and the decisions of a road 
planning authority responsible both for road maintenance and for the enforcement of 
overloading control. At the lower (reactive) level, the overloading decisions of the carriers 
impact on road maintenance expenditure, while at the upper (anticipatory) level the planner 
decides fine and enforcement levels by anticipating the responses of the carriers. A case study 
using data from Mexico is used to illustrate the method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will model the interaction of decision makers as actors in the freight transport 
system. In freight transport, the outcomes and impacts are influenced by many decision–
makers, though far fewer than in the case of passenger transport. In recognising the presence 
of multiple actors (Fisk, 1986), a number of authors have turned their attention to an explicit 
representation of their behaviour, models being proposed with manufacturers, retailers and 
consumers as decision-makers (Nagurney et al, 2002; Nagurney & Toyasaki, 2005; Sheu et 
al, 2005; Figueiredo & Mayerle, 2008) and, more recently, third party logistics service 
providers (Panayides & So, 2005). However, one special form of actor often overlooked is the 
government or planner, whose decisions regarding regulations and pricing will influence the 
decisions made by other decision makers, and who indeed may make pro-active decisions that 
anticipate such influences on other actors. There are relatively few authors that consider the 
decision-making process of a regulatory/government body responsible for addressing the 
societal impacts of decisions taken by other players. Exceptions to this remark include, for 
example, the work of Chang et al (2007), who developed a decision-making tool for 
government agencies in planning for flood emergency logistics. Babcock & Sanderson (2006) 
investigated the impact on track and bridge maintenance costs of a change in policy to more 
economically efficient but heavier axle-load cars. Tzeng et al (2007) proposed an approach 
for planning relief delivery in the event of a major natural disaster, whereby the planner 
weighs up the potentially conflicting objectives. 
In the present paper, part of a larger study, we shall focus on the particular issue of road 
maintenance costs and the impacts of vehicle overloading practices by freight transport 
carriers. Specifically, through a modelling approach, we examine the pro-active actions that 
may be taken by a planning authority responsible both for the recurrent maintenance of the 
roads and for the regulation of overloading, in order that (in the long-run equilibrium) the 
authority may cost-effectively and efficiently discharge its responsibilities on behalf of 
society. While this is an extremely important issue for policy-makers, articles on this topic 
appear relatively rarely in the formal academic literature, though this issue is evident in the 
wider, public-domain literature (ACSE, 2002; Dueker & Fischer, 2003; McKinnon, 2005; 
Knight et al, 2008; NVF, 2008). 
The paper begins in section 2 by establishing the significance of road damage due to 
overloading, and the potential for its mitigation by enforcement policies. Drawing on this 
evidence, we present in section 3 a mathematical modelling approach for the control of 
 3 
overloading, which respects the reactive nature of the carriers’ decisions while allowing the 
planner to adopt a higher level, anticipatory role when making strategic planning decisions. In 
sections 4 & 5, a case study based on Mexican data is used to illustrate the approach. 
 
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF OVERLOADING, ROAD DAMAGE AND ENFORCEMENT 
We begin our study by briefly examining the empirical evidence for the scale and impacts of 
the overloading problem for lorries (better known in some places as ‘trucks’), and then move 
on to the role that existing enforcement procedures play. As a motivation for our subsequent 
modelling approach, we shall specifically examine the perspectives of the different ‘actors’ 
involved, in our case the carriers and planners.  
From the road planner’s viewpoint, overloading clearly generates serious impacts in the form 
of accelerated pavement wear and damage to bridges. Literature exists reporting both the 
prevalence of overloading practices and its resultant impacts. James et al (1987) and Harik et 
al (1990) both report on the effects of overloading on bridges in the USA. Specifically, Harik 
et al report on bridge failures from 1951 to 1988, where overweight lorries were recorded as 
the cause of total bridge collapse in 23 times out of 92 collapses. An OECD (1998) study 
across seven countries found up to 20% of vehicles to be overloaded in one of the 
participating countries (Finland), and up to 10% of axles in two countries (Italy and 
Germany). Road maintenance decision-making in developing countries was examined by 
Klockow and Hofer (1991) and Martinez (2001). In Mexico, overloading practices were 
recorded in a series of large-scale national surveys over the period 1991–2000 (Durán et al, 
1996; Gutiérrez et al, 1999; Gutiérrez & Mendoza, 2000). In the period 1991–1997 the most 
serious cases were seen to be articulated six-axle lorries, where average overloading 
percentages of between 45% and 74% were recorded.  
There is therefore ample evidence of widespread overloading practices. It is consequently 
necessary to consider the impact on road wear. From the well-known American Association 
of State Highways Officials (AASHO) road experiments in 1958–60 emerged the theory of 
road damage from axle weight as an n
th–power law, with n  4 (Highway Research Board, 
1962; Small, Winston & Evans, 1989; Cole & Cebon, 1991; TRB, 2007). The 4
th
-Power Law 
states that structural pavement damage for a given axle is nearly proportional to the 4
th
 power 
of the ratio of the axle load to a ‘standard’ axle weight (that standard varying between 
countries; for example, 8.16 tonnes in our case study country, Mexico). A commonly used 
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Typical axle weights (tonnes) Damage Damage
Vehicle type Axle1 Axle2 Axle3 Axle4
GVW    
(tonnes)
factor   
(ESALs)
relative to 
family car
Family car 0.5 0.5 - - 1.0 0.00003 1
Light commercial 0.5 1 - - 1.5 0.00024 8
HGV 2-axles
empty 3.06 3.06 - - 6.1 0.039 1402
half laden 4.58 6.61 - - 11.2 0.529 18792
full laden 6.1 10.16 - - 16.3 2.709 96320
HGV 4-axles
empty 4.0 3.2 1.7 1.7 10.6 0.085 3020
half laden 4.79 6.68 5.04 5.04 21.6 0.857 30464
full laden 5.58 10.16 8.38 8.38 32.5 4.836 171903
measure for this damaging impact is the Equivalent Standard Axle Load (ESAL). For a 
vehicle with m axles, the corresponding damage factor in ESALs equals (assuming a standard 
axle weight of 8.16 tonnes): 
 
 
where loadaxletheis thj jA in tonnes. In operational terms, the damage factor represents 
the equivalent number of passes of one standard-axle that would produce the same wearing 
effect as one pass of the lorry (Urquhart and Rhodes, 1990).  
Although there has been debate concerning the appropriate value of the power in the equation 
for the damage factor (eg. Small et al, 1989), it is undoubtedly the case that the functional 
dependence of the damage with respect to vehicle weight makes the road repair costs very 
sensitive to goods vehicle overloading practices. By way of illustration, Table 1 gives the 
damage factors of several typical UK vehicles and their loads, assuming a 4
th
-power law. For 
example, by increasing from half to fully laden increases the damage factor more than five-
fold for both a two-axle and a four-axle Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Road damage impacts of several typical UK vehicles (from Urquhart & Rhodes, 1990) 
In response to the severe effects noted of vehicle overloading, it is natural to ask what might 
be done by way of enforcement of legal loading limits. Many of the reports on overloading in 
the literature stress the fact that current enforcement schemes are inadequate to handle the 
problem. For example, Walton and Yu (1983) in a case-study from Texas (USA) estimated, 
for a 20-year period starting at the current conditions of their study, that extra costs resulting 
from overloading for the state would be $261 million, and only a fraction of this amount 
4
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State
Maximal 
legal weight 
(lb)
Payload 
(lb)
Expected 
Benefit ($)
Expected 
Cost of 
Fine ($)
Net Incentive to 
Overweight ($)
Tennessee 73,280        80,000    245 3 242
Indiana 73,280        80,000    325 134 191
Iowa 80,000        90,000    425 180 245
would be offset by the $84 million that would be collected from weight regulation 
enforcement. 
From the viewpoint of the carriers, there is evidence that fine levels are too low to eradicate 
overloading, and instead they consider fines as another operation cost, to be traded off against 
other costs involved (Euritt, 1987). By way of illustration, Paxson & Glickert (1982) reported 
the effect of fine structures for three American states in the early 1980s, as indicated in Table 
2, where the weakness of the enforcement schemes is manifest. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Effect of fines on overloading incentives (based on Paxson & Glickert, 1982) 
 
Two basic parameters define the efficacy of an enforcement scheme: a) the inspection effort 
and b) the level of the fine. The former determines the probability of catching offenders, 
which multiplied by the latter, gives the expected fine that an overloading violator will face. 
The probability of catching violators varies from place to place, depending on the road 
network size and the resources available. For example, interviews with enforcement officials 
conducted by Paxson and Glickert (1982) gave estimates of apprehension probabilities of 5%, 
20% and 15% for Tennessee, Indiana and Iowa respectively.  
In conclusion, the interaction between the agentsthe planner and the carriersin the 
overloading issue is explained by each party aiming to minimise their own costs. The road 
planner is the proactive party, anticipating the carriers’ reactions to the possible deterrent 
actions taken by the planner. To reduce overloading, the road planner implements a penalty 
scheme, determining a fine and a probability of detecting violators. Given the tonnes to lift 
and the trip distance, determined either by the market or by logistics needs, the carriersthe 
reactive partychoose the amount to load their vehicles, aiming to minimise the 
transportation cost including any expected fines to be paid. The fines collected from the 
remaining violators also partly offset the planner’s expenditure on road maintenance, yet 
enforcement is itself a potentially expensive task, the cost of which must be balanced against 
its positive impacts in reducing road wear. In the remainder of this paper we aim 
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systematically to capture these influences and potentially conflicting objectives of the carriers 
and planner, through a mathematical modelling approach. 
 
3. BI-LEVEL MODELLING APPROACH TO OVERLOADING CONTROL 
3.1 Problem formulation 
The evidence presented in section 2 establishes the case for a strategic planning tool to assist 
the planner in making efficient, anticipatory decisions regarding the balance of effort devoted 
to loading enforcement and road repair costs. A strong theme running through section 2 was 
the presence of multiple objectives, the planner’s primary interest in the costs of road 
maintenance and overloading enforcement, with some recompense available through fines 
collected, and the carriers’ loading decisions being motivated by their own individual 
economic considerations, including vehicle operating costs, and the possibility of incurring 
fines for overloading. We thus need, as a minimum, a mathematical approach for dealing with 
problems with multiple objectives. 
Looking to the literature, several potential mathematical approaches may be found for 
addressing such a problem, in related fields. Hu et al (2002) considered hazardous waste 
applications, proposing a problem in which government regulations were represented as 
constraints to a cost minimisation problem. In a similar technical spirit, Nozick (2001) 
considered generic facility location problems, where the objective is to minimise cost while 
satisfying some minimum level of service, with the desires of consumers (level of service) 
represented as a constraint. Likewise, Jula et al (2005) considered optimal routing of 
container lorries including so-called ‘social constraints’, which are enforced by the carriers to 
ensure that drivers do not work beyond a certain amount of hours per shift. Chang et al (2007) 
proposed a stochastic programming problem with capacity constraints for emergency logistics 
planning. In contrast to the focus on constraints, Korpela et al (2001) adopted a weighted 
optimisation approach, with a single objective function optimized that balances customer 
service with environmental performance. Tzeng et al (2007), on the other hand, avoided the 
need to pre-define weights, proposing a fuzzy logic-based, multi-objective optimization 
approach, whereby the planner weighs up the potentially conflicting objectives of minimising 
total cost, minimising total travel time and maximising minimal satisfaction. 
The bi-level approach we propose to adopt is quite different to the above approaches, being 
neither based on (single level) multi-objective optimization nor on the representation of 
 7 
conflicting requirements as constraints. Past work in related fields that has relevance to our 
approach is now considered. Brotcorne et al (2000) adopted a bi-level programming approach 
to a freight tariff setting problem, where the ‘leader’with an upper level objective of 
revenue maximisationis one among a group of competing carriers, and the ‘follower’ is a 
shipper with a lower level objective of minimising transportation cost. Kara & Verter (2004) 
also adopted a bi-level approach for selecting network links available to carriers of hazardous 
materials. In this problem, the ‘regulator’ minimises an upper level risk-based objective in 
terms of population exposure, and carriers at the lower level choose routes to minimise total 
transportation cost. Castelli et al (2004) proposed a bi-level linear program formulation of a 
two-player Stackelberg game between a ‘shipper’, minimising a lower level objective of 
transportation cost, and a traffic authority applying some form of regulation to an upper level 
objective which seeks to maximise the flow through the subset of links under the authority’s 
control. In the same game-theoretic spirit, Nagurney et al (2002) and Nagurney & Toyasaki 
(2005) proposed a joint equilibrium model of three groups of non-cooperative actors, 
representing manufacturers, retailers and consumers. 
For the problem considered in the present paper, we adopt a long-run equilibrium approach 
suitable for strategic planning, which is based on bi-level programming. We believe that such 
a bi-level formulation most closely reflects the decision-making hierarchy desired, in terms of 
allowing the planner to apply pro-active policy measures, as well as reflecting the differing 
levels of predictive ability available to the planner and the carriers. While it is reasonable to 
expect the planner to be able to anticipate the impact of loading enforcement measures on the 
carriers, it seems difficult to believe that individual shippers can anticipate the impacts of 
their loading decisions on the planner’s policy.  Thus, it is natural to associate the planner as a 
‘leader’ and the carriers as ‘followers’, in game theoretic terms.  
Thus it remains to set out the specific approach proposed to the overloading control problem. 
The relevant lower and upper level objective functions are first defined in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively, before describing the overall bi-level programming approach in section 3.4.  
 
3.2 Lower level objective: The carriers’ objective 
Based on the framework proposed, the main purpose of the lower level model is to describe 
the responses of freight carriers to changes in enforcement and fine levels. While there may in 
practice be a multitude of responses, we shall focus on the decision of how heavily carriers of 
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a given class choose to load their vehicles. Such a focus, we believe, is justifiable taking into 
account the focus of the study, namely the impact of heavy axle loads on road damage. We do 
not, therefore, consider decisions such as routing of vehicles, perhaps to avoid likely locations 
of weigh-stations, or longer-term decisions for a carrier such as fleet composition. If such 
decisions are deemed important, then they could be accommodated within the modelling 
approach by some kind of hierarchical decision model.  
We suppose that the product is of sufficiently high density that volume constraints of the 
vehicle are not a factor, even when significantly overloaded in weight. Therefore, as volume 
considerations are immaterial, we shall refer to the decision variable for the carriers as the 
load factor, defined as the ratio of the tonnes carried to vehicle capacity, given a specific 
commodity and vehicle type for transporting the load. Once the carrier knows the loads to 
move and the trip distance, the load factor chosen will determine the cost per Tkm (tonne-
km). It is supposed that the carrier will not waste vehicle capacity, so the assumed load factor 
is at least one. Private carriers will try to minimise this cost per Tkm, as will for-hire carriers 
in order to improve the total trip profit.  
Now in the problem considered, there are many instances in which either the factors affecting 
the carriers’ decisions or the factors affecting the planner’s objective function may differ 
substantially between carriers (or even between different movements made by the same 
carrier). Examples of such factors include the payload capacity of the vehicle (offering the 
potential to overload), the axle configuration of the vehicle (impacting on the road damage 
effect of a given load), the suspension type of a vehicle (again affecting road damage impact), 
the operating costs/efficiency of particular vehicle types (affecting trade-off with fines), the 
commodity type (packaging shape, density, etc.) being transported (with volume and packing 
constraints/considerations affecting overloading potential and operating costs), the  
distribution of load over the axles affecting road-wear (varying by vehicle and commodity 
type), the distance the commodity must be transported (affecting the potential to detect 
overloading), and the pavement characteristics over which the commodity is transported 
(based on wear vulnerability). 
While it may be desirable to reflect all such differences, in practice the availability and cost of 
collecting such data will inevitably limit the number of such dimensions for which the 
impacts may be distinguished. In order that the approach has maximum generality, and so can 
be tailored to the particular data availability of each case, the model proposed is developed 
around the notion of a class. Each class represents a particular combination of all the attribute 
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dimensions that the modeller may wish to distinguish. Therefore, throughout the presentation 
of the model to follow, we shall define which attributes may vary by class, and allow the 
precise definition of a class to be made when any case study of the method is made (such as 
the one in sections 4 and 5). 
Thus consider a carrier of a specific class k (k = 1,2,…K) moving kT  tonnes (where Tk is 
many times the capacity of a single lorry) over kd  kilometres, and define: 
kL  = lorry’s payload capacity (legal full-laden payload) 
kE  = cost per km of an empty movement 
kx  = load factor used (the load to capacity ratio) 
)( kk xV  = vehicle operating cost per Tkm, a function depending on kx  
kp  = probability of catching an offender on any randomly-selected trip of class k 
F = fine (monetary units) per tonne in excess of the payload capacity  
 w = the number of inspection points. 
Then the expected cost for a carrier of class k, , is: 
 kC1  = vehicle operating cost + empty movements cost + expected fine. 
In our model we shall assume that the penalty level for overloading is a sliding scale that is 
proportional to the amount of overload. Real systems will be discrete; even at their finest level 
they will only vary to the nearest penny/cent/dollar/pound. What we are doing in our model is 
an approximation to such a system. Our model will serve as a good approximation to the 
discrete system if there are many payment steps, but not so good if there are only one or two 
steps. In this latter case the method we have proposed could readily be used with a predefined 
step function replacing the linear function. Since in the end we propose examining fine levels 
on a discrete scale (see section 5.3), this change would make no material difference to the 
methodology. For simplicity, to be consistent with the strategic planning nature of the method 
we propose, we have decided to retain the simple assumption of a continuous sliding scale. 
We are considering a case of bulk movement of materials, in which case the lorries will either 
be fully loaded, or overloaded. Since the operation requires   
kk
k
Lx
T
  vehicles, the expected 
cost for the carrier is thus: 
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The probability kp   in equation (2) naturally depends on the number of inspection points the 
planner places on the road network, but it also depends on the trip distance kd , since the 
longer the trip the greater the chance of finding an inspection point. The rationale behind this 
is that the planner, faced with a given fixed budget (total number of detectors for the road 
network), will assign detectors to roads in proportion to road-length; thus, for example, the 
planner is twice as likely to assign a detector to a 2 km stretch as a 1 km one, since the 
planner wants to minimise damage, which is linearly related to length. 
Assuming a road network to be monitored for overloading that covers N kilometres in total 
and having w inspection points uniformly distributed across this network, the probability r of 
being detected on any one randomly-selected kilometre is  
N
w
r  . Hence, the probability of 
evading detection in one kilometre is  1  r, whilst the probability of evading detection along 
a full trip of d kilometres is  (1  r)d, assuming independence between kilometre sections. So, 
the probability p of being detected in a d kilometre trip is:  
     p = 1  (1  r)d  .      (3) 
Substituting this expression (3) into equation (2) gives: 
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Given the values of the fine level F and number of inspection points w determined by the 
planner, it is assumed that a class k carrier will search for the optimal load factor *kx  
minimising kC1  in equation (4), even if this causes the carrier to overload. For this optimising 
purpose this equation shows that the total tonnes kT  to move is not relevant, and the impact of 
fines on the carrier’s cost kC1  vanishes when the load factor 1kx . 
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3.3 Upper level objective: The road planner’s objective 
The road repair costs result from the damage that lorries inflict on the road according to the 
load factor at which carriers choose to operate. For each class k, the damaging power is 
evaluated from the unit damage cost U (in monetary units per ESAL-km) and a function 
)( kk xg  estimating the resulting ESALs from the vehicle load factor kx . In this context, it 
should be recalled that the class k might reflect the vehicle type as well as the assumed 
distribution of the load and the suspension type for the lorry (though in the case-study 
reported in section 5, we shall take k to represent only vehicle type). 
To control overloading, the planner must choose the number of inspection points w on the 
road and the imposition of a fine F in monetary units per tonne in excess of the legal limit. On 
the fine level F, it would seem sensible to impose an upper bound on the permissible values, 
since otherwise it may have negative economic impacts on the ability to trade and move 
goods. While the manning of inspection points has a cost for the planner, the resulting fine 
collection is an income that reduces total costs. So the expected cost to the planner is:  
 2C road damage cost  total expected fines + cost of manning inspection points. 
As previously in section 3.2, we consider a road network of a total length of N kilometres 
with w inspection points, and denote: 
U = unit damage cost per ESAL-km 
)( kk xg  = ESALs function for class k, dependent on load factor kx  
S = cost of manning one inspection point. 
As in section 3.2, the number of vehicles required to move kT  tonnes a distance of kd  
kilometres is 
kk
k
Lx
T
. Then, for each vehicle of class k the road damage cost imposed is 
)( kkk xgUd  and the expected fine for the excess tonnes is F
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which simplifies to: 
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3.4 The bi-level carrier/planner interaction problem 
Once the mutual influence of carriers’ and planners’ decisions is recognised, the planner’s 
proactive character and his/her implicit authority to regulate road transport entitle this actor to 
play the leading part in this interaction. The planner, conceived in this proactive role, is 
assumed to know the possible reactions of carriers under diverse circumstances and thereby 
may anticipate them. The road planner may thus select some of his/her decision variables to 
induce the carriers’ behaviour in the direction of meeting the planner’s objectives. 
We should stress at this point that the purpose of our approach is to find a kind of 
‘behavioural equilibrium’, a stable point where the individual actors (planner and carriers) 
have no incentive to change their behaviour based on their individual objectives. This is very 
different from a global system-optimum where the costs and benefits to all actors appear in a 
single, weighted objective function, but where the solution may not be realisable or may be 
unstable.  
In terms of the cost objective functions for the carrier and the planner described in equations 
(4) and (6) respectively, the bi-level optimisation problem to solve is: 
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where it is assumed that Mx  is the maximal load factor that physically a lorry can stand (say, 
3Mx  may be a reasonable assumption), MF  is the maximum politically acceptable fine 
level and Mw   is the maximal number of inspection points the planner is able to install.  
It should be noted that this approach differs from the equilibrium resulting from a procedure 
whereby the planner starts by making a decision, then the carrier responds with his/her own 
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decision, then the planner makes a subsequent move and so on, as would happen in a Nash 
non-cooperative game (see for example: Fisk, 1984). The approach presented, rather than 
searching for a non-cooperative equilibrium under a series of planner-carrier decisions, 
develops the optimal solution instead by moving on the surface constraints that define the 
optimal decisions for the carrier under the choice possibilities of the planner. That is to say, 
there is a hierarchy in the decision-making. In this way, the road planner, able to predict any 
reaction of the carrier, will choose the most appropriate combination of number of inspection 
points and fine levels so as to get the minimal total expenditure (on repair and overloading 
inspection costs, less fine revenue). 
Our purpose in constructing problem (7) is to define the potentially conflicting processes of 
planner and carrier, and with this in mind our way of applying this approach in the following 
two sections will be to explore and plot the objective function surfaces numerically. Our 
purpose in exploring the surfaces can be distinguished from an aim to devise efficient 
methods for computing bi-level optimum solutions. For the reader who may be interested in 
such algorithmic approaches, see, for example, Yang & Bell (2001), where congestion leads 
to interdependencies in the travel choices, and where the resulting problem has the much 
more complex nature of an MPEC, Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
(Luo, Pang and Ralph, 1996).  
 
4. CASE STUDY: OVERLOADING EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO 
In 1991 the Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT) began conducting 
an annual road freight survey to collect data on lorries intercepted whilst using the paved road 
network. The main objective of this field study was to improve the knowledge of lorry traffic, 
since the usual sources arising from invoices, permits and taxes could not give information 
about local traffic, seasonal variations in flows, or overloading (Rico et al, 1997). The annual 
survey identifies the type of vehicle used, the size and weight of the vehicle sampled, the type 
of cargo moved, the origin and destination of movement, the kind of packing used, and the 
type of trade for the load (domestic or international). Information on overloading has emerged 
from these surveys, allowing a first look at the problem in Mexico based on actual data. From 
these surveys the five main vehicle types, representing nearly 97% of the fleet surveyed, were 
identified: rigid 2-axles, rigid 3-axles, articulated 5-axles, articulated 6-axles and double 
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Maximum Maximum                1 9 9 5                1 9 9 6                 1 9 9 7
Vehicle 
type
Legal 
GVW     
(tonnes)
Payload 
(tonnes)
Average 
GVW 
(tonnes)
Excess 
tonnes
Load 
factor
Average 
GVW 
(tonnes)
Excess 
tonnes
Load 
factor
Average 
GVW 
(tonnes)
Excess 
tonnes
Load 
factor
C2 17.5 9.8 19.5 2.0 1.20 20.3 2.8 1.29 19.8 2.3 1.23
C3 26 17.3 29.6 3.6 1.21 30.8 4.8 1.28 30.2 4.2 1.24
T3-S2 44 25 50.4 6.4 1.26 50.4 6.4 1.26 50.3 6.3 1.25
T3-S3 48.5 35.1 58 9.5 1.27 57.3 8.8 1.25 58.7 10.2 1.29
T3-S2-R4 66.5 48 82.6 16.1 1.34 81.2 14.7 1.31 80.8 14.3 1.30
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articulated 9-axles. The Mexican classification code for these vehicle types is: C2, C3, T3S2, 
T3S3 and T3S2R4, respectively. 
The infringement to GVW limits can be seen from the average GVWs recorded in the 
surveys. Table 3 displays the average GVW recorded in the surveys from 1995 to 1997 along 
with the resulting load factor for each vehicle type. This table shows average load factors 
approximately between 1.2 and 1.3, for all vehicle types, as well as the higher tonnes in 
excess carried by the articulated lorry types, as compared to those moved by the rigid types. 
 
 
Table 3: GVWs in overloaded Mexican lorries. (based on Gutiérrez & Mendoza, 2000) 
 
Figure 1 shows GVW averages, as well as the maximum permitted GVW in 1996, for three 
trip conditions: empty movement; not overloaded; and overloaded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average GVW for Mexican lorries in the 1996 survey 
(based on Gutiérrez et al, 1999). 
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Type Axle1 Axle2 Axle 2+3 Axle 4+5 Axle 6+7 Axle 8+9 Axle 4+5+6
C2 0.51 0.72
C3 0.66 0.95
T3S2 0.63 0.80 0.88
T3S3 0.64 1.16 1.43
T3S2R4 0.66 0.89 1.02 0.80 0.96
          Single axle               Double Axle Triple Axle
Vehicle 
type
1 2 2+3 4+5 6+7 8+9 4+5+6
C2 0.3 6.1 --- --- --- --- ---
C3 2.9 --- 33.0 --- --- --- ---
T3S2 0.2 --- 36.9 24.8 --- --- ---
T3S3 1.3 --- 49.0 --- --- --- 34.5
T3S2R4 0.1 --- 42.6 29.1 11.2 23.5 ---
The degree of overloading for individual axles was also detected in these surveys. Table 4 
displays the ratios of average weights on axles to maximum permitted axle weight of the five 
Mexican lorry types, with data of 92113 vehicles recorded in 15 survey stations (Rascón et al, 
1997). Particularly noteworthy in these data are the remarkable average excesses of 16% and 
43% for tractive double axle 2+3 and triple axle 4+5+6 in the articulated type T3S3, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Ratio of observed average axle weight of loaded lorries to permitted 
maximum axle weight: Five main Mexican types (based on Rascón et al, 1997) 
 
Table 5 shows the percentage of axles exceeding the maximum permitted axle load recorded 
in the 1996 survey. This table indicates that tractive double axle 2+3, both in the rigid C3 type 
and in all the articulated types, represents the most common violation to axle load limits, 
whereas steering axle 1 represents the least common violation. This reflects variable load 
distribution along the lorry platform, which has almost no effect on axle 1, as compared to the 
rest of the axle groups. As background to these data, it should be noted that they occur in spite 
of weight enforcement, which is in place for lorries overloading both in GVW and in axle 
loads. Apart from vehicle detention and permit revocation for recidivists, violators face fines 
increasing with the degree of excess load. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Percentages of axles exceeding axle load limits for loaded Mexican lorries in 
1996 (Gutiérrez et al, 1999) 
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5. APPLICATION OF BI-LEVEL APPROACH TO MEXICO CASE STUDY 
5.1 Context 
In order to provide a clear example of the way in which our bi-level modelling approach 
could be applied, we shall consider a particular context for our Mexico case study network. 
We suppose that there is a given total amount of some bulk commodity that needs to be 
moved over a portion of the road network; we assume that lorries are not currently carrying 
dense goods and so are not overloaded, thus the network currently has no inspection points for 
overloading control. We shall apply our method to the five lorry types introduced in section 4, 
assuming that market forces will lead all carriers to choose to run just a one of these  lorry 
types for this bulk commodity.  
5.2 Estimating ESALs and VOCs 
In order to apply the modelling approach presented in problem (7) to the Mexico case study 
described in section 4, we must first estimate the functions )( kk xg  (measuring the ESALs 
imposed on the road by each vehicle class  k) and )( kk xV  (measuring the operating cost per 
Tkm for vehicle class  k). In this particular study, five classes were used corresponding to five 
different vehicle types, and so we will use the terms ‘class’ and ‘vehicle type’ 
interchangeably.  
Focusing first on )( kk xg , a function was estimated from ESAL calculations based on the axle 
weights observed in each type of vehicle surveyed in 1997. In that year, twenty survey 
stations weighed 128,619 vehicles, giving values for the average weight for individual axles 
in each lorry type. With these average weights of axles, the corresponding load factor and 
ESALs were estimated. By comparing the model fit of various functional forms to these data, 
the g functions illustrated in Figure 2 were selected. These particular g functions are based on 
a fourth order polynomial, for which the individual coefficients are of no interest as they are 
subject to multi-collinearity, a problem which does not affect predictions (which is the sole 
purpose we have for using these functions). From Figure 6, the vehicles can be ordered in 
decreasing order of sensitivity of ESALs to the load factor, as: T3S2, T3S3, C3, T3S2R4 and 
C2. This suggests that for enforcement purposes, the most controlled vehicle type should be 
T3S2, followed by T3S3 and C3. 
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Figure 2: ESAL functions for the five main Mexican vehicle types 
Moving on to the estimation of the vehicle operating costs (VOC), these were obtained 
through several runs of the World Bank’s HDM-VOC v.4.0 software, which calculates the 
physical consumption and vehicle operating costs for a range of vehicle types and a range of 
road characteristics.  This model stems from a major World Bank programme: the Highway 
Design and Maintenance (HDM) Standards Study. Several experiments and user-surveys 
(conducted in Kenya, Brazil, India and the Caribbean) generated a vast amount of knowledge 
on vehicle operating costs under a diversity of road conditions, and much of this is adapted in 
the model to the user’s conditions (Archondo-Callao. and Faiz, 1994, pp. 6-10).  
Based on the lorries’ unit costs from 2001 reported in a Mexican study (Arroyo and 
Aguerrebere, 2002), the HDM-VOC v.4.0 was run assuming that all vehicles moved in a free-
flowing traffic environment, on a homogeneous road pavement of fair quality, with a 
moderate roughness (International Roughness Index, IRI = 2.5 m/km), an average gradient of 
3%, and horizontal curvature of 100°/km. This is typical of the road type that one may 
encounter in Mexico. Figure 3 shows the VOC per Tonne-km obtained for the main five 
Mexican types. Appendix 1 shows the input data used in these runs for the Mexican type rigid 
3-axles (code classified “C3”). “Cargo Delay Cost” was estimated based on Values of Time 
(VOT) for Mexican lorries in 1992 reported by the World Bank (Gwilliam, 1997), and 
adjusted to prices in 2001. Crew time costs were obtained from Arroyo and Aguerrebere 
(2002).  
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Figure 3: VOC per Tonne-km. Five main Mexican types (using the results 
presented in Table 6) 
 
 
 
Based on these observations, VOC per Tkm functions )(xVk  were fitted for each vehicle type. 
The general fitting equation used was: 
    2210)( xx
x
xV 

  .     (8) 
The term 
x

 in equation (8) reflects the reduction of average costs as fewer vehicles are 
required to move a given tonnage,  whilst the quadratic term 2210 xx    reflects the 
increasing driving time and maintenance costs as load factors rise to the point at which the 
vehicle becomes unable to move (and the function becomes vertical). Table 6 displays the 
results of the statistical fitting exercise and Table 7 gives the results in equation form. These 
functions are illustrated in Figure 3, and as can be seen the minima occur at different load 
factors for different lorry types. 
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Vehicle 
Type 
Coefficients 
θ                    
                                     
β0 
   
β1 
                  
β2 
R-sq 
C2 0.311 0.182 -0.067 0.018 0.996 
 (24.114) (5.956) (-3.261) (4.587)  
C3 0.226 0.456 -0.371 0.141 0.997 
 (10.356) (6.524) (-5.391) (6.694)  
T3S2 0.284 0.180 -0.068 0.018 0.997 
 (44.467) (11.944) (-6.754) (8.932)  
T3S3 0.183 0.264 -0.161 0.051 0.995 
 (19.776) (10.176) (-7.424) (9.164)  
T3S2R4 0.118 0.458 -0.407 0.152 0.994 
 (7.569) (9.002) (-7.870) (9.230)  
      
 
Table 6: Estimated coefficients and t-values for VOC/Tkm functions 
 
Type Fitted equation   
C2 
2
1 019.0067.0182.0
311.0
)( xx
x
xV   
C3 
2
2 141.0371.0456.0
226.0
)( xx
x
xV   
T3S2 
2
3 018.0068.0180.0
284.0
)( xx
x
xV   
T3S3 
2
4 051.0161.0264.0
183.0
)( xx
x
xV   
T3S2R4 
2
5 152.0407.0458.0
118.0
)( xx
x
xV   
 
Table 7: Fitted equations for VOC/Tkm functions 
 
 
5.3 Solution Procedure 
Our procedure for analysing optimisation problem (7) basically consists of constructing a 
picture of the complete upper-level surface over which the planner may search, when 
‘constrained’ (mathematically) by the load-factor decisions that globally minimise the lower 
level problem at some given levels of enforcement. We shall then observe and interpret 
features of this surface. In order to do this we evaluate the upper level objective function 2C  
at each of a grid of values for the number of weighing stations w and fine level F, when each 
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load factor kx  in 2C  is given by the global minimiser ),(
* Fwxk  of the lower level objective 
kC1 with respect to kx , at those values of w and F. An alternative approach would have been 
to utilise an optimisation algorithm to find local stationary points of the mixed-integer bi-level 
problem (7). Our approach, though less elegant, has the advantage that we are able to explore 
features of the surfaces of both planner and carriers, including the possibility for the existence 
of multiple stationary solutions, and to examine the trade-off between enforcement levels and 
maintenance costs for sub-optimal solutions. 
 
5.4 Results and Policy Implications 
In our model, the planner’s ability to make a positive influence is highly determined by the 
responses induced in the carriers, and so it is a natural first step to understand the nature of 
this response (i.e. “the lower level problem” of (7)).  Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the optimal 
load factor ),(* Fwxk  over a region of values for (w, F), for the Mexican lorry types C3 and 
T3S3. In both cases, the assumed trip has a length of 850 km and must move 600 tonnes in 
total.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Carriers’ optimal load factor for Mexican type C3, as a function of the number 
of inspection points and the fine level. 
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The VOC per Tkm functions used are those calculated in Table 7. The fine level range 
considered is 45003000  F  (Mexican Pesos) in steps of 50, and the number of weighing 
stations considered is }25,...,2,1{w . The network length assumed was 110,000 km, 
approximately the length of the current Mexican paved road network. Figures 4 and 5 exhibit 
the deterrent effect of increasing fines and the number of weigh-stations on the optimal load 
factor for the carriers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Carriers’ optimal load factor for Mexican type T3S3, as a function of the 
number of inspection points and the fine level. 
 
Both Figures 4 and 5 show that as more weighing stations are installed and higher levels of 
fine are set, the surfaces ultimately flatten so that the carrier chooses an optimal load factor as  
x* = 1, i.e. exactly the legal payload (where, it should be recalled, we assume that the cargo is 
dense enough for us to neglect volume constraints). On the other hand, there exist many 
plausible combinations of fine level and number of weigh stations at which overloading is an 
optimal decision to make for the planner, in spite of the fine; thus we are able to capture the 
realistic phenomenon of overloading observed in the surveys reported in section 4.  
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Figure 6. Total planner’s cost as a function of the number of inspection points and 
fine level, anticipating response of carriers. Mexican Type C3 traffic example. 
 
Let us now consider what happens when these responses of the carriers are embedded in the 
planner’s upper level objective function. Figures 6 and 7 show the resulting surfaces for the 
planner when there is a single lorry/carrier type responding (i.e. K = 1); in Figure 6, the single 
type is the Mexican types C3, and in Figure 7 it is type T3S3, and so Figures 6 and 7 are a 
counterpart to Figures 4 and 5. These Figures show that we are able to capture the plausible, 
decreasing trend of the planner’s total cost as more inspection points are set and fine levels 
are increased, even when we take account of enforcement costs. Following the carrier’s 
responses, shown in previous Figures 4 and 5, the planner’s total cost surfaces flatten once the 
optimal load factor falls to unity, with just a small upward tilt as extra inspection points are 
added.  
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Figure7. Total planner’s cost as a function of the number of inspection points and 
fine level, anticipating response of carriers. Mexican Type T3S3 traffic example. 
 
This procedure was repeated for the five main Mexican types, assuming the same conditions 
of total tonnage and distance covered, and in each case assuming that all vehicles are of that 
single type. These results are shown in Tables 8 and 9.  
 
Type 
Optimal 
Fine Level 
Optimal 
No. of 
inspection 
points 
Estimated        
Minimal        
Planner's 
Cost 
Road 
damage 
cost 
Fine 
Income 
Inspection 
Cost 
Carrier's 
Optimal 
Load 
Factor 
chosen 
C2 4330 19 122184 112684 0 9500 1.00 
C3 4420 17 116508 108008 0 8500 1.00 
T3S2 4440 17 212907 204407 0 8500 1.00 
T3S3 4310 13 64894 58394 0 6500 1.00 
T3S2R4 4400 11 43227 59051 21323 5500 1.11 
Table 8. Planner’s cost components at optimal solutions to the bi-level problem 
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Type 
Optimal 
Fine 
Level 
Optimal 
No. of 
inspection 
points 
Estimated               
Carrier's 
Cost 
No. of 
lorries 
used 
Vehicle 
operating 
cost 
Empty 
run cost 
Fine 
cost 
Carrier's 
Optimal 
Load 
Factor 
chosen 
C2 4330 19 407188 61.4 226950 180239 0 1.00 
C3 4420 17 396019 34.7 230520 165499 0 1.00 
T3S2 4440 17 376007 24.0 211140 164867 0 1.00 
T3S3 4310 13 294969 17.1 171870 123099 0 1.00 
T3S2R4 4400 11 274064 11.3 152906 99835 21323 1.11 
Table 9. Carrier’s cost components at optimal solutions to the bi-level problem 
Tables 8 and 9 are inter-linked, and so need to be carefully explained. We shall begin by 
focusing on just one row of each table, corresponding to vehicle type C3. Tables 8 and 9 
indicate that (for this type C3) there is a region of optimal solutions to the bi-level problem, 
these optimal solutions occurring when (i) the number of inspection points is 17, and the fine 
level is at least 4420, and (ii) the carrier’s LF (Load Factor) is 1.00. Since at such a solution 
no fines are being paid, then raising the fine level above 4420 adds no income to the planner 
and no cost to the carrier. On the other hand, at a fine level of at least 4420, increasing the 
number of inspection points beyond 17 would add cost for the planner, but would gain no 
reduction in damage cost because there is no overloading to deter, and therefore strategies 
involving more than 17 points could not be optimal. Turning attention to Table 9, again just 
focusing on vehicle type C3, then we can see the total carrier’s cost at the bi-level solutions, 
as well as the components of this cost (vehicle operating cost, empty running cost and fine 
cost). For this vehicle type, the policy implication is that the fine level and number of 
inspection points gives a sufficient deterrent to any overloading, and thus the fine cost is zero; 
however, this does not mean that the values of the fine level and number of inspection points 
are immaterial, since they are active in controlling the load factor.   
Turning our attention to an alternative vehicle type, namely T3S2R4, we see a rather different 
kind of solution, and thereby different policy implications. In this case there is a unique 
solution to the bi-level problem (subject to the rounding used in the discretisation of fine 
levels). Looking at Table 9, it is noticeable that this vehicle type requires significantly fewer 
lorries than other vehicle types; this is because this is a larger vehicle with a greater capacity, 
and because at the optimal solution the carriers are choosing to overload it (by 11%). In doing 
so, the carriers are choosing to accept a fine cost of 21323; if they chose not to overload, then 
they would incur a greater cost (in terms of operating and empty running cost) in needing 
more vehicles. However, it is important to appreciate when comparing the carrier’s response 
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for T3S2R4 with that for C3, we are not comparing their response at the same fine/inspection 
levels; it is the decisions of the planner that are effectively driving the differing decisions of 
the carrier regarding overloading. Looking now at Table 8, we see for type T3S2R4 the same 
figure 21323 as income to the planner, which is sufficient to outweigh the road damage cost 
caused by the overloading. This solution is globally stable in the sense that neither carrier nor 
planner has any incentive to move from the solution shown, and there are incentives for any 
deviation from this solution to be reversed. Having chosen type T3S2R4, carriers have no 
incentive to choose a load factor of other than 1.11, and the planner has no incentive to 
change from having 11 inspection points (with continually changing locations) and a fine 
level of 4400. Should the carriers acquire any other type of lorry, the planner will increase the 
number of inspection points (as per Table 8) and carriers will find themselves with higher 
costs than if using type T3S2R4, even with the additional inspection points (not shown), and 
market forces will dictate a change to using type T3S2R4. This example illustrates the 
benefits of our approach, in being able to suggest an optimal policy for the planner while 
handling the complexity of these interactions between the different decision-makers. 
A final interesting implication of this case study may be seen by comparing all five lorry 
types in Tables 8 and 9. From these tables, the lorry type giving the smallest optimal planner 
cost is 43227 for type T3S2R4, and in fact in this example this type also gives the smallest 
optimal carrier cost (of 274064). Therefore, if the carrier has the choice of which type of lorry 
to operate, which is what we would expect in the long run, then it is optimal for both the 
planner and carrier for this load to be transported by vehicles of type T3S2R4. It should be 
noted that the fact that planner and carrier objectives would pull in the same direction is not a 
necessary condition (in contrast with system optimization methods, for example; Crainic et al, 
1990), but rather is an outcome of applying our method to this case-study. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper has extended the methods for modelling multi-actor, multi-level modelling 
approaches in freight transport (Nagurney et al, 2002; Nagurney & Toyasaki, 2005)which 
consider manufacturers, retailers and consumers as decision-makersto take into account the 
objective of a planner who aims for a societal optimum by minimising expenditure on road 
maintenance costs though overloading control. The main contributions of this paper to the 
literature are as follows: 
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 A novel modelling approach has been developed in order to explicitly represent the 
decision-making process of the planner aiming for a societal optimum through a 
hierarchical, bi-level approach. This approach explicitly separates the objectives of 
planners and carriers, representing the anticipatory power of the planning authority as 
a ‘leader’. This may be contrasted with previous methodological approaches to 
problems of a similar structure in freight transport, which are limited by the fact that 
they aim to incorporate conflicting objectives of the actors into a single level 
optimization problem, either by constraints (e.g. Hu et al, 2002; Nozick, 2001; Jula et 
al, 2005), weighted optimization (e.g. Korpela et al, 2001), or a (single-level) multi-
objective optimization (Tzeng et al, 2007). 
 As a component of our modelling approach, we have developed functions to represent 
the objectives of planners and carriers and have related these to decisions each may 
selfishly make. This provides a more realistic alternative to the aggregate ‘system-
optimal’ methods (e.g. Crainic et al, 1990) of strategic freight transport planning, 
which aim to compute the potential benefits that would be theoretically attainable if 
all players conformed to the wishes of a central authority. Our bi-level method, in 
contrast, assumes that each player will act in their own best interest. As a result, our 
method produces an attainable optimum solution, rather than a theoretical optimum, as 
well as providing the policy measures that would lead to such an attainable optimum. 
 We have demonstrated our approach with a case study of Mexico, with procedures 
described for calibrating the elements of our method, exploiting a variety of data 
sources on loading practices and road damage effects. The results of the case study are 
a contribution to the public policy literature on road planning and maintenance (Dueker 
& Fischer, 2003; McKinnon, 2005; Babcock & Sanderson, 2006; Knight et al, 2008).  
 
We believe that, in the future, the method proposed is easily generalisable, either with 
alternative model assumptions or applied to alternative planning contexts. For example, in 
terms of the specific model assumptions we have adopted, we may wish to model the impacts 
of variance in demand caused by variation about the (mean) long-run equilibrium value, or 
the feedback from an increase in carriers’ costs to the quantity to be shipped (i.e. elastic 
demand). In terms of alternative planning contexts, the general approach might be applied to 
other kinds of externality. For example, building on Sathaye et al (2010), we might consider 
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extending our method to investigate optimal load factors considering the potentially 
conflicting objectives of minimising road maintenance impacts and minimising emissions. In 
this respect, the particular set of assumptions we have addressed in the present paper should 
be viewed as just one example of a variety of alternative (arguably more realistic) sets of 
assumptions that could have been made in place of those we chose. It is our intention to take 
the literature forward, rather than dissuade others from trying other variants in future. Indeed, 
we feel that these very possibilities, of taking what we have done further, are a large part of 
the value of the paper. 
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Appendix 1. Input Data for Mexican Type in the HDM-VOC v.4.0 
 
                     FREE-FLOW VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS MODEL
__ Input Data Report ___________________________________________________________
Roadway Characteristics
  Surface type                  Code: 1-Paved   0-Unpaved                    1
  Average roughness (IRI)                 m/km                            2.50
  Average positive gradient               %                               3.00
  Average negative gradient               %                               3.00
  Proportion of uphill travel             %                              50.00
  Average horizontal curvature            deg/km                        100.00
  Average superelevation                  fraction                        0.01
  Altitude of terrain                     m                            1000.00
  Effective number of lanes     Code:1-One  0-More than one                  0
Heavy truck (Mexican Type C3)
Vehicle Characteristics
  Tare weight                             kg                           8800.00
  Load carried                            kg                              0.00
  Maximum used driving power              metric HP                     190.10
  Maximum used braking power              metric HP                     347.23
  Desired speed                           km/hour                        90.00
  Aerodynamic drag coefficient            dimensionless                   0.85
  Projected frontal area                  m^2                             7.00
  Calibrated engine speed                 rpm                          2100.00
  Energy-efficiency factor                dimensionless                   0.80
  Fuel adjustment factor                  dimensionless                   1.15
Tire Wear Data
  Number of tires per vehicle             #                              10.00
  Wearable volume of rubber per tire      dm^3                            7.30
  Retreading cost per new tire cost       fraction                        0.45
  Maximum number of recaps                dimensionless                   3.39
  Constant term of tread wear model       dm^3/m                          0.16
  Wear coefficient of tread wear model    10E-3 dm^3/kj                  12.78
Vehicle Utilization Data
  Average annual utilization              km                         150000.00
  Average annual utilization              hours                        2860.00
  Hourly utilization ratio                fraction                        0.85
  Average service life                    years                           8.00
  Use constant service life ?   Code: 1-Yes       0-No                       1
  Age of vehicle in kilometers            km                         500000.00
  Passengers per vehicle                  #                               0.00
Unit Costs (Mexican Pesos 2001, based on Arroyo & Aguerrebere, 2002)
  New vehicle price                       $                          508300.00
  Fuel cost                               $/liter                         3.79
  Lubricants cost                         $/liter                        11.32
  New Tire cost                           $/tire                       1361.70
  Crew time cost                          $/hour                         38.30
  Passenger delay cost                    $/hour                          0.00
  Maintenance labor cost                  $/hour                         31.07
  Cargo delay cost                        $/hour                         73.94
  Annual interest rate                    %                              10.00
  Overhead per vehicle-km                 $                               0.47
